Alles erscheint so einfach, alle erforderlichen Kenntnisse erscheinen so flach, alle Kombinationen so unbedeutend, daß in Vergleichung damit uns die einfachste Aufgabe der höheren Mathematik mit einer gewissen wissenschaftlichen Würde imponiert.
Introduction
As financial interests in sports raise, fairness is increasingly under pressure, and research on this issue is becoming more and more relevant. Fairness has several different interpretations in sports. In the following, the principle that equally skilled competitors should have the same chance to win is adopted.
Many tournament designs seem to violate this simple requirement. For example, show that in round-robin tournaments among three or four symmetric contestants, there is a first-mover advantage driven by strategic effects arising from the subgame perfect equilibrium. Krumer and Lechner (2017) give an empirical proof of this finding. Analogously, the ranking used in Swiss-system tournaments, a design widely used in chess, fails to incorporate the strength of schedule adequately, therefore it favors players with an improving performance during the tournament (Csató, 2013 (Csató, , 2017b .
We address the problem of penalty shootouts in soccer (association football) from the viewpoint of fairness. Before 1970, soccer matches that were tied after extra time in knockout (elimination) tournaments were either decided by a coin toss or replayed. However, the events in the 1968 European football championship led FIFA, the international governing body of association football, to try penalty shootouts (Anbarcı et al., 2018) .
According to the existing system of penalty shootouts (IFAB, 2018) , the referee tosses a coin and the winner can decide whether to take the first or the second kick. After that, the two teams and kick five penalties each in an alternating pattern, which can be called the mechanism. If the scores are level after the five rounds, the sudden death stage starts in the same order with additional rounds of one kick each until the tie is broken.
Since most penalties are successful, the player taking the second kick is usually under greater mental pressure, especially from the third or fourth penalties onward, when a miss probably means the immediate loss of the match. Consequently, the team kicking first in a penalty shootout is recognized to win significantly more than 50 percent of the time (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Da Silva et al., 2018) . In order to reduce this bias, the IFAB (International Football Association Board), the rule making body of soccer, has decided to test the Alternating Rule (Cohen-Zada et al., 2017 Echenique, 2017) 2 González-Díaz and Palacios-Huerta (2016) have obtained a similar result in multi-stage chess contests between two players as the player drawing the white pieces in the odd games has about 60% chance to win the match. FIDE, the governing body of chess, has also recognized the existence of asymmetric psychological pressure: while the World Chess Championship 2014 applied the rule, in the World Chess Championship 2016 the colors were reversed halfway through, so Magnus Carlsen played with the white pieces in the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 10th, 12th games according to the sequence.
The current rulebook of soccer, Laws of the Game 2018/19 (IFAB, 2018) explicitly says in its section discussing future plans that the IFAB will focus on fairness and integrity issues. Furthermore, working with its expert panels, it will consult widely on a number of important Law-related topics, including a potentially fairer system of taking kicks from the penalty mark.
Thus it can be no surprise that there exists a growing literature on penalty shootouts (McGarry and Franks, 2000; Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Jordet et al., 2007; Sainz De Baranda et al., 2008; Bar-Eli and Azar, 2009; Wilson et al., 2009; Memmert et al., 2013; Hubbard and Britto, 2014; Dohmen and Sonnabend, 2018; Vandebroek et al., 2018) , and, especially, on their optimal design (Anbarcı et al., 2015 (Anbarcı et al., , 2018 Brams and Ismail, 2018; Echenique, 2017; Palacios-Huerta, 2012) . The latter topic has got some media attention during the recent FIFA World Cup, for example, on the pan-European news media service Euronews (Euronews, 2018) .
Our departure is the central finding of Brams and Ismail (2018) that the so-called Catch-Up Rule makes penalty shootouts substantially fairer. A slightly modified version of this mechanism, the Alternating Catch-Up Rule, is introduced: it prohibits the team kicking the first penalty to be the first-mover in the sudden death stage. We show that the Catch-Up Rule does not outperform the more simple Alternating ( ) Rule, but the Alternating Catch-Up Rule is fairer than both of them.
The relevance of the current research is reinforced by our observation that the governing bodies in soccer seem to be increasingly open to suggestions from academic research. Besides the trial of the rule for penalty shootouts, we mention three cases here. First, the draw for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, unlike the previous editions of the tournament, determined all pots by each national team's October 2017 FIFA World Ranking. This reform was probably inspired by Guyon (2015) . Second, after the official soccer ranking was often subject to criticism (see, e.g. Lasek et al. (2016) ), FIFA Council announced a new formula for the FIFA / Coca-Cola World Ranking on 10 June 2018 (FIFA, 2018). Finally, Durán et al. (2017) constructed an alternative that overcomes the main drawbacks of the previous schedules for FIFA World Cup South American Qualifiers, which was unanimously approved by all CONMEBOL (South American Football Confederation) members and was used in the qualifier tournament for the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the penalty shootout designs to be analyzed in Section 3. Some concluding thoughts are offered in Section 4.
Penalty shootout rules
Soccer is a game with usually a low number of scores, therefore ties (even the result of 0-0) are relatively common. Since in knockout (elimination) tournaments only one team advances to the next round, these ties should be broken. Furthermore, penalty shootout may be a special tie-breaking rule in round-robin tournaments. For example, in the group stage of the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, if two teams, which have the same number of points and the same number of goals scored and conceded, play their last group match against each other and are still equal at the end of that match, their final rankings are determined by kicks from the penalty mark, provided that no other teams within the group have the same number of points on completion of all group matches (UEFA, 2018, Article 20.2 (IFAB, 2018, Section 14) . In the latter case, five kicks are taken alternately by the teams such that the team that wins a coin toss decides whether to take the first or second kick. If, after both teams have taken five kicks, the scores are level, kicks continue until one team scores a goal more than the other from the same number of kicks (sudden death). This rule is called the Standard ( ) Rule in penalty shootouts (Brams and Ismail, 2018) .
The team favored by the coin toss almost always chooses to kick first, in order to put psychological pressure on the other team. More than 90% of coaches and players asked in a survey want to go first (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010) .
4 Empirical research supports their decision: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) have observed that the team kicking first wins the penalty shootout with a 60.5% probability (the dataset contained 269 shootouts between 1970 to 2008), Kocher et al. (2012) have found this number to be 53.3% (based on 540 shootouts from 1970 to 2003), while Palacios-Huerta (2014) has reported a 60.6% advantage (the dataset contained 1001 shootouts between 1970 and 2013). Finally, Da Silva et al. (2018) have shown that the first-mover wins with a probability of 59.5% (on the basis of 232 shootouts from 1970 to 2016).
In order to mitigate the bias caused by coin tossing, Brams and Ismail (2018) suggest a mechanism called the Catch-Up Rule, which takes into account the results of penalties in the preceding round to give an opportunity for the team performing worse to catch up. Let the two teams be and . Assume that kicks first, so it is advantaged in a particular round. In the next round, will kick first except if fails and succeeds.
Our proposal is based on the Catch-Up Rule, but it contains a slight improvement. The penalty shootout is essentially composed of two parts: the first five rounds, and, possibly, the sudden death stage. Therefore, it makes sense to balance the advantage of the first-mover by making it disadvantaged at the beginning of sudden death. Formally, if kicks first in the first round, then kicks first in the sixth round (provided that it is reached). Under the original Catch-Up Rule, it is possible that kicks first in the sixth round, for instance, when it leads by 4-3 after four rounds, but fails and succeeds in the fifth round of penalty kicks. This version is called the Alternating Catch-Up Rule.
As an illustration, consider the case when team scores three penalties by missing the second and the fifth, while team also scores three penalties by missing the second and the fourth. Since the first two penalties are successful (1-1), kicks first in the second round, where both of them miss (1-1). Then starts the third round, when both teams succeed (2-2), thus kicks the first penalty in the fourth round, but it fails and wins (2-3). Since the (Alternating) Catch-Up Rule aims to equalize the winning odds, remains the first kicker, and it succeeds, while fails in the fifth round (3-3). The shootout goes to sudden death, where kicks first according to the Catch-Rule, but kicks first if the Alternating Catch-Up Rule is applied. Consequently, the Catch-Up sequence is (Mirror, 2018) .
Perhaps the simplest way to reduce the unfair advantage is the Alternating ( ) Rule, when the first-mover in a given round kicks the second penalty in the next round, so the order of the penalty kicks is . It is not analyzed in Brams and Ismail (2018) , however, the authors consider it as a potential candidate to be implemented. Following Brams and Ismail (2018) , we adopt the reasonable assumption that, in the case of equally skilled players, the probability of a successful kick depends only on whether the team kicks first or second in a round. The advantaged team has a probability of scoring, and the disadvantaged team has a probability of scoring.
Comparison of three penalty shootout designs
As an illustration, Brams and Ismail (2018) analyze the effects of the Catch-Up Rule for a penalty shootout over two rounds and derive that = 3/4 and = 2/3 result in:
• the probability of team winning is 2 ( ) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
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• the probability of team winning is 2 ( ) = 39/144 ≈ 0.270;
• the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 64/144 ≈ 0.444.
If there is a tie after two rounds, the shootout goes to sudden death. Assume that team kicks first and let ( ) be the probability that wins the sudden death stage. The Catch-Up, Alternating Catch-Up, and Alternating ( ) Rules coincide in sudden death, the calculations of Brams and Ismail (2018) remain valid, that is,
For = 3/4 and = 2/3, we get ( ) = 10/19 ≈ 0.526. If the penalty shootout is played over two rounds before sudden death, the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 64/144. Under the Catch-Up Rule, kicks first in the third round with a probability of 58/144 ≈ 0.403, while kicks first in the third round with a probability of 6/144 ≈ 0.042. Consequently, the probability that team wins is On the other hand, the Alternating Catch-Up Rule guarantees that team kicks first in the sudden death, therefore the probability that team wins under this mechanism is
Regarding the Alternating ( ) Rule, there are three ways for team to win a penalty shootout over two rounds:
scores on both rounds while fails to score on both On the first round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and fails, while kicks second and succeeds with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability of this outcome over both rounds is
(1 − )(1 − ) .
II) 2-1:
scores on both rounds while fails to score on one of these rounds There are two cases:
• scores on the first round On this round, both teams succeed with probability . On the second round, kicks first and fails, while kicks second and succeeds with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − ) .
• scores on the second round On the first round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and succeeds, after which succeeds, with probability . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − ) .
Hence the probability of the outcome 2-1 is
scores on one round while fails to score on both rounds There are two cases:
• scores on the first round On this round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, both teams fail with probability (1 − )(1 − ). The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ).
• scores on the second round On the first round, both teams fail with probability (1 − )(1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and fails, after which succeeds, with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ) .
Thus the probability of the outcome 1-0 is
Using the assumption = 3/4 and = 2/3, we get that:
• the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 62/144 ≈ 0.431.
Alternating ( ) Rule guarantees that kicks first in the sudden death (third round), so the probability that team wins is To summarize, while all the three alternative designs tend to equalize the winning probabilities compared to the Standard ( ) Rule, the Alternating Catch-Up Rule seems to be the closest to fairness: while the Catch-Up and Alternating ( ) Rules give 6.8% and 4.64% advantage for the team kicking the first penalty, respectively, the Table 1 for penalty shootouts lasting eight or fewer predetermined rounds with a subsequent sudden death when = 3/4 and = 2/3. These values lead to an advantage for team under the Standard ( ) Rule which is close to the empirical bias (Brams and Ismail, 2018) . The probabilities of the Catch-Up Rule have already been reported by Brams and Ismail (2018) up to five rounds.
All the three methods, especially the Alternating ( ) Rule, exhibit a small oddeven effect (the bias is greater for an odd number of predetermined rounds). As expected, they make the contest fairer if the number of rounds increases. The simplest Alternating ( ) Rule is better than the Catch-Up Rule for an even number of rounds, while the latter has a marginal advantage for an odd number of rounds. However, the Alternating Catch-Up Rule consistently outperform both. The smallest bias can be observed for a penalty shootout over four rounds, followed by sudden death if the shootout is still unresolved: in this case, the team kicking first has only 0.58% more chance to win under the Alternating Catch-Up Rule.
So far, we have investigated winning probabilities only for = 3/4 and = 2/3. Figure 1 compares 5 ( ) using the presented rules for three different pairs of ( ; ) as (2/3; 3/5), (3/4; 2/3), and (3/4; 3/5). It shows that the fairness of these designs is not influenced by the particular values of and , the Catch-Up and the Alternating ( ) Rules perform similarly, while the Alternating Catch-Up Rule turns out to be the best.
The expected length of sudden death depends only on the values of and , it is 1/( + − 2 ), the same for all rules (Brams and Ismail, 2018) . The Catch-Up and Alternating Catch-Up Rules differ only in the team kicking the first penalty of the sudden death stage. However, the probability of reaching sudden death is greater with the (Alternating) Catch-Up Rule than with the Alternating ( ) Rule as Figure 2 illustrates. Consequently, the former mechanisms can make the penalty shootout more exciting.
It has been presented recently that certain sports rules do not satisfy strategy-proofness, that is, a team might be better off by exerting a lower effort (Csató, 2017a (Csató, , 2018a Sonin, 2013, 2017; Vong, 2017) . The Alternating ( ) Rule is not vulnerable to any kind of strategic manipulation since neither team can influence the order of shooting. Brams and Ismail (2018) prove that no team is interested in missing a kick under the Catch-Up Rule if ( − ) ≤ 1/2, which seems highly likely to be met. The Alternating Catch-Up Rule presents fewer opportunities to change the order of 
Conclusions
Tournament organizers supposedly design fair rules. However, the standard soccer penalty shootout mechanism contains a well-known bias in favor of the first shooter, which can be a problem because an order of actions that provides an ex-post advantage to one team may harm efficiency by reducing the probability of the better team to win. Consequently, we agree with the IFAB and other researchers that there is little excuse to continue to use the current rule for penalty shootouts.
We have demonstrated by a mathematical model that the recently suggested Catch-Up Rule is not worth to implement since it is not fairer than the more simple Alternating ( ) Rule. On the other hand, the Alternating Catch-Up Rule seems to be a promising candidate if penalty shootouts should be made as fair as possible.
